21.A.3A Reporting system

LINK BETWEEN POINT 21.A.3A AND REGULATION (EU) No 376/2014 Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council lays down requirements on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation. Compliance with point 21.A.3A of Part 21 does not exempt organisations from compliance with Regulation (EU) No 376/2014. For each category of reporter, Regulation (EU) 2015/1018 defines the nature of items to be mandatorily reported. Regulation EU) No 376/2014 also considers voluntary reporting of other items that are perceived by the reporter as a threat to aviation safety. Point 21.A.3A lays down requirements for the mandatory reporting of events to the competent authority, in view of performing the necessary activities linked to the continued airworthiness of aircraft, parts, and appliances. For Part 21 design organisations (DOs) and production organisations (POs), the reportability criteria (i.e. a potential unsafe condition) are the same as the ones laid down by Regulation (EU) No 376/2014. Furthermore, compliance with Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 does not exempt organisations from compliance with point 21.A.3A. However, this should not give rise to two parallel reporting systems, and point 21.A.3A and Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 should be seen as complementary in that respect. In practice, this means that reporting obligations under point 21.A.3A on one hand and reporting obligations under Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 on the other hand are compatible. These reporting obligations may be discharged using one reporting channel. In addition, any natural or legal person that has more than one role subject to the obligation to report may discharge all those obligations through a single report. Organisations are encouraged to properly describe this in their organisation manual, to address cases in which the responsibilities are discharged on behalf of the organisation.

COLLECTION, INVESTIGATION, AND ANALYSIS OF EVENTS In the context of the following AMC and GM to point 21.A.3A, the term ‘event’ refers to any failure, malfunction, defect, error, near miss, hazard identification, incident, accident, or other occurrence that is subject to a reporting system. The ‘collection’, ‘investigation’, and ‘analysis’ functions of the system should include means: to analyse events and related available information; to identify adverse trends; to investigate the associated root cause(s); and to determine any necessary corrective action. It should also allow the determination of reportable occurrences as required by point 21.A.3A(a)(3) or 21.A.3A(b)(3), as applicable. In addition, for parts whose failure could lead to an unsafe condition, the ‘analysis’ function of the system should ensure that reports and information sent, or available, to the design approval holder (DAH) are fully investigated so that the exact nature of any event and its effect on continuing airworthiness is understood. This may then result in changes to the design and/or to the instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA), and/or in establishing a mitigation plan to prevent or minimise the possibility of such occurrences in the future, as necessary. The ‘analysis’ is not limited to those occurrences that require the involvement of EASA under point 21.A.3A(e).

COLLECTION, INVESTIGATION, AND ANALYSIS OF DATA RELATED TO FLAMMABILITY REDUCTION MEANS (FRM) RELIABILITY Holders of a TC, an RTC, an STC, or any other relevant approval that is deemed to have been issued under Part 21, which have included an FRM in their design, should continuously assess the effects of aeroplane component failures on FRM reliability. This should be part of the system for the collection, investigation, and analysis of data, which is required by point 21.A.3A(a). The applicant/holder should therefore:

(a)demonstrate effective means to collect FRM reliability data; those means should provide data that affect FRM reliability, such as component failures;

(b)unless alternative reporting procedures are approved by EASA, submit a report to EASA every 6 months for the first 5 years after service introduction; after that period, continued reporting every 6 months may be: replaced with other FRM reliability tracking methods that are deemed acceptable by EASA; or eliminated if it is established that the FRM reliability meets, and will continue to meet, the exposure specifications in paragraph M25.1 of Appendix M to the Certification Specifications for Large Aeroplanes (CS-25); and

(c)develop service instructions or revise the applicable aeroplane manual, according to a schedule that is approved by EASA, to correct any failures of the FRM that occur in service, which could increase any fuel tank’s fleet average flammability exposure to more than what is specified in paragraph M25.1 of Appendix M to CS-25.

COLLECTION, INVESTIGATION, AND ANALYSIS OF DATA RELATED TO EDTO-SIGNIFICANT OCCURRENCES

(a)Holders of a TC, an RTC, an STC, or any other relevant approval that is deemed to have been issued under Part 21 and includes extended diversion time operation (EDTO) capability should implement a specific tracking, reporting, and resolution system for EDTO-significant occurrences. That system should be suitable to ensure the initial and continued fleet compliance with the applicable EDTO reliability objectives, and be part of the system for the collection, investigation, and analysis of data, which is required by point 21.A.3A(a). Appropriate coordination should exist between the engine TC holder, the propeller TC holder, the auxiliary power unit (APU) ETSO authorisation holder, and the aircraft TC holder, to ensure compliance with the EDTO reliability objectives.

(b)For the tracking, reporting, and resolution of EDTO-significant occurrences, refer to the latest edition of AMC 20-6 of the ‘General Acceptable Means of Compliance for Airworthiness of Products, Parts and Appliances’ (AMC-20).

GENERAL — COLLECTING SYSTEM The term ‘collection’ means the setting up of systems and procedures that will enable relevant failures, malfunctions, and defects, or other occurrences, to be properly collected when they occur. As the collection system needs to accept reports that originate outside the organisation (from operators, maintenance organisations, suppliers, etc.), it is necessary to inform possible reporters of the existence of the system and of the appropriate means to introduce reports into it. This does not presume that direct access to the system is to be granted if other mechanisms are more appropriate. The collection system should also ensure the collection, through an internal reporting scheme, of internal errors, near misses, and hazards that are perceived by the reporter as an actual or potential aviation safety risk. Considerations for the collection of information related to events should include the following: the analysis of failure rates; the early rejection of parts from service; and comparison with the certification assumptions.

GENERAL In the context of points 21.A.3A(a), 21.A.3A(e), and 21.A.3A(f), the phrase ‘[…] or any other relevant approval deemed […]’ refers to ‘grandfathered’ design approvals under Part 21, as defined in Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 748/2012. Design approval holders (DAHs) of minor changes and minor repairs do not have to comply with the requirements in point 21.A.3A(a), as according to the classification criteria for design changes and repairs (see points 21.A.91 and 21.A.435), minor changes and minor repairs have no appreciable effect on the characteristics that affect the airworthiness of the product. However, it should be noted that the obligations under Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 and its implementing acts still apply.

EVENTS REPORTED VOLUNTARILY TO THE ORGANISATION A natural or a legal person (including organisations that are not approved by a Member State) may voluntarily report to an organisation any event that is perceived by that person as posing an actual or potential hazard to aviation safety. Voluntary reports may be originated by:

(a)persons that are not listed in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014; or

(b)persons that are listed in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, even though such events are not included in Regulation (EU) 2015/1018; or

(c)an organisation, if such organisation cannot determine whether the event should be mandatorily reported. Example A maintenance staff member in a maintenance organisation is reporting to their maintenance organisation a perceived design issue that is not covered by Regulation (EU) 2015/1018. The maintenance organisation should make a final assessment of the voluntary report and if it assesses that the reported event ‘may involve an actual or potential aviation safety risk’, then it should mandatorily report it to the TC holder, the competent authority, etc., as per point 145.A.60 ‘Occurrence reporting’ of Annex II (Part-145) to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014. If the maintenance organisation cannot determine whether a safety risk exists (due to lack of competence, lack of data, etc.), it could voluntarily report the event to the TC holder for further assessment.

INTERNAL SAFETY REPORTING SCHEME The internal safety reporting scheme is part of the overall collection system. The objective of this GM is to provide specific guidance on the internal safety reporting scheme only.

(a)The overall objectives of the internal safety reporting scheme are: to collect information that is reported by the organisation staff; and to use that reported information to improve the safety of operations, in conjunction with the safety management elements that are defined in points 21.A.139 and 21.A.239. Each internal safety reporting scheme should include provisions for confidentiality and enable and encourage free and frank reporting of events, as those listed in points 21.A.3A(a)(1)(i) and (ii). This is facilitated by establishing a ‘just culture’.

(b)The specific objectives of the scheme are to:

(1)enable an assessment of the safety implications of each relevant event that is reported, including previous similar events, so that any necessary action can be initiated; and

(2)ensure that lessons from relevant events are shared so that other persons and parts of the organisation may learn from them.

(c)The scheme is an essential part of the overall management system and should be complementary to routine procedures and ‘control’ systems; it is not intended to duplicate or supersede any of them. The scheme is a tool to identify those instances in which routine procedures have failed or may fail.

(d)All safety-related reports should be retained as the significance of such reports may only become obvious later.

(e)The collection and analysis of timely, appropriate, and accurate data will allow the organisation to react to the information that it receives and to take necessary action.

REPORTING TO THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY Within the overall limit of 72 hours, the degree of urgency for submitting a report should be determined by the level of risk that is judged to have resulted from the occurrence. If an occurrence is judged by the organisation that identified the possible unsafe condition to have resulted in an immediate and particularly significant hazard, EASA (or the competent authority of the Member State, as required) should be advised immediately and by the fastest possible means (telephone, fax, email, telex, etc.) of whatever details are available at that time. This initial report must be followed up with a full written report within 72 hours. An example would be an uncontained engine failure that results in damage to the aircraft primary structure. In all other cases, the submission of the report may be delayed up to a maximum of 72 hours after determining the possible unsafe condition, in order to provide more details.

REPORTING TO THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY — GENERAL

(a)The reference to ‘is aware of an occurrence’ implies that the organisation identifies the event as one that falls into the category of occurrences to be reported — usually when the organisation determines that the event is reportable. The 72-hour period starts when the possible unsafe condition is identified.

(b)For organisations that have their principal place of business in a Member State, Regulation (EU) 2015/1018 lays down a generic ‘list classifying occurrence in civil aviation to be mandatorily reported’. This list should not be understood as being an exhaustive collection of all the issues that may pose a significant risk to aviation safety and, therefore, reporting should not be limited to the items that are listed in that Regulation.

(c)AMC-20 provides further details on occurrence reporting (AMC 20-8) and also applies to organisations that are approved under Part 21 and do not have their principal place of business in a Member State.

(d)Point 21.A.3A(a)(3) requires the reporting of occurrences that may result in an unsafe condition. GM1 21.A.3B(b) ‘Failures, malfunctions and defects — Determination of an unsafe condition’ could be used to assist in that determination.

FOLLOW-UP TO, AND CLOSURE OF, REPORTED OCCURRENCES

(a)The organisation should transmit the following information to the competent authority within 30 days from the date of notification of the occurrence to the competent authority:

(1)the latest position of the design organisation (DO) as to whether an unsafe condition is confirmed;

(2)the results of the analysis and of the first investigation — including the cause(s) of the occurrence, if known; and

(3)the measures it has taken, intends to take, or proposes to be taken, including:

(i)containment measures that have already been defined by the reporting organisation and put in place (if any) ; and

(ii)in the case of reports made by the DO, for unsafe conditions, a risk assessment supporting that the product can be operated safely (see GM 21.A.3B(d)(4)) until the corrective action is defined and implemented, or that immediate mitigation measures need to be implemented until a more refined risk assessment can be provided. Organisations are encouraged to provide a complete analysis and follow-up as soon as available and, in principle, no later than 3 months after the occurrence notification. It is recognised that analysing an occurrence may take longer than 3 months, especially if the investigation is complex or where the services of a special investigator are required. The requirements for follow-up are not intended to jeopardise the quality and thoroughness of an occurrence analysis. It may be detrimental to safety if the analysis is completed in a rush within the encouraged 3-month period without properly establishing the root cause(s), making a risk assessment, and determining whether remedial action is required. The design approval holder (DAH) and the production approval holder (PAH) should cooperate, as necessary, to ensure that any corrective action can be implemented. In addition, affected organisations are expected to cooperate under their respective regulatory framework from the reporting of an occurrence until its closure, to ensure complete results. The final (close-out) report should include: the final DAH position as to whether an unsafe condition exists; the results of the occurrence analysis and of the final investigation, including the cause(s) of the occurrence; any corrective and preventive action by the reporting organisation; and in the case of reports made by the DO, a risk assessment supporting that those corrective and preventive measures allow the product to be operated safely (see GM 21.A.3B(d)(4)).

(b)Notwithstanding point (a), when the organisation identifies that no unsafe condition exists as a result of its analysis of a voluntarily reported occurrence, it can delay further communication to the competent authority up to the issuance of the final report and report the occurrence as closed upon issue (data exchange). In such cases, no follow-up report should be submitted. The final report to EASA should include confirmation and justification that no unsafe condition exists. The organisation is requested to provide information on the cause(s) of the occurrence and on any corrective or preventive action that was taken by the organisation. This way of reporting should not be understood as an accepted deviation from the requirements of Part 21. If at any stage during the investigation, the organisation identifies that a possible unsafe condition exists, this should be communicated to EASA via a mandatory report within 72 hours.