ADR.OR.F.045 Management system

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM The management system of the organisation responsible for the provision of AMS should encompass safety by establishing an organisational structure for the management of safety which is proportionate and appropriate to the size of the organisation and the complexity and type of its operations. Depending on the size of the organisation and the type and complexity of its operations, the safety management system should include the establishment of internal safety committees.

INTERNAL SAFETY COMMITTEES Organisations responsible for the provision of AMS may find it beneficial to establish a Safety Review Board and Safety Action Groups, and depending on their organisational complexity and structure, Safety Services Office to support Safety Manager in the execution of the assigned tasks, especially in cases where the organisation provides AMS in multiple aerodromes.

SAFETY SERVICES OFFICE

(a)The Safety Services Office is managed by the Safety Manager and is independent and neutral in terms of the processes and decisions made regarding the provision of services by the operational unit(s).

(b)The functions of the Safety Services Office normally support the Safety Manager in the following:

(1)the management and oversight of the hazard identification system;

(2)the monitoring of the safety performance of the operational unit(s) that is (are) directly involved in the provision of apron management services (AMS);

(3)the provision of advice to the senior management on safety management matters; and

(4)the provision of assistance to line managers on safety management matters.

SAFETY REVIEW BOARD AND SAFETY ACTION GROUP

(a)The Safety Review Board:

(1)is a high-level safety committee that considers matters of strategic safety in support of the accountable manager’s safety accountability; and

(2)is chaired by the accountable manager and composed of heads of functional areas.

(b)The Safety Review Board monitors:

(1)the organisation’s safety performance against the safety policy and safety objectives;

(2)that any safety action is taken in a timely manner; and

(3)the effectiveness of the organisation’s safety management processes.

(c)The Safety Review Board ensures that appropriate resources are allocated for the organisation to achieve the safety objectives.

(d)The safety manager or any other relevant person, as appropriate, may attend the Safety Review Board meetings. They may communicate to the accountable manager all the relevant information, as necessary, to allow decision-making based on safety data.

(e)Depending on the size of the organisation and the type and complexity of its operations, the responsibilities of the Safety Review Board may be transferred in other high-level committees of the organisation.

(f)The Safety Action Group

(1)The Safety Action Group may be established as a standing group, or as an ad hoc group, to assist or act on behalf of the Safety Review Board;

(2)More than one Safety Action Group may be established, depending on the scope of the task and the specific expertise required;

(3)The Safety Action Group reports to, and takes strategic direction from, the Safety Review Board, and is comprised of managers, supervisors, and personnel from operational areas.

(4)The Safety Action Group:

(i)monitors operational safety;

(ii)resolves identified risks;

(iii)assesses the impact of operational services on safety;

(iv)ensures that safety actions are implemented within the agreed timescales.

(5)The Safety Action Group reviews the effectiveness of previous safety recommendations and safety promotion activities.

SAFETY SERVICES OFFICE, SAFETY REVIEW BOARD AND SAFETY ACTION GROUP Different terms may also be used for the Safety Services Office, the Safety Review Board and the Safety Actions Group.

SAFETY POLICY

(a)The safety policy should:

(1)be endorsed by the accountable manager;

(2)clearly identify safety as the highest organisational priority;

(3)reflect organisational commitments regarding safety and its proactive and systematic management;

(4)be communicated, with visible endorsement, throughout the organisation;

(5)include safety-reporting principles; and

(6)be periodically reviewed to ensure that it remains relevant and appropriate to the organisation.

(b)The safety policy should:

(1)include a commitment to:

(i)improve towards the highest safety standards;

(ii)comply with all applicable legal requirements, meet all applicable standards, and consider best practices;

(iii)provide appropriate resources;

(iv)enforce safety as the primary responsibility of all managers and personnel; and

(v)apply ‘just culture’ principles in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, and, in particular, not to make available or use the information on occurrences:

(A)to attribute blame or liability to front line personnel or other persons for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training; or

(B)for any purpose other than the maintenance or improvement of aviation safety;

(2)include safety-reporting procedures;

(3)with reference to ‘just culture’, clearly indicate which types of operational behaviours are unacceptable, and include the conditions under which disciplinary action would not apply; and

(4)be periodically reviewed to ensure that it remains relevant and appropriate to the organisation.

(c)Senior management should:

(1)continually promote the safety policy to all personnel, and demonstrate their commitment to it;

(2)provide the necessary human and financial resources for its implementation; and

(3)establish safety objectives and performance standards.

SAFETY POLICY Safety policy — General The safety policy is the means whereby the organisation states its intention to maintain and, where practicable, improve the level of safety in all its activities, and to minimise the risk of an aircraft accident as far as reasonably practicable. It reflects the management’s commitment to safety, demonstrates the organisation’s philosophy of safety management, and becomes the foundation on which the organisation’s management system is built. It serves as a reminder of ‘how we do business here’. The creation of a positive safety culture begins with the issuance of a clear and unequivocal direction. The commitment to apply ‘just culture’ principles forms the basis for the organisation’s internal rules describing how ‘just culture’ principles are guaranteed and implemented, as required by Article 16(11) of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROCESS

(a)The organisation responsible for the provision of AMS should coordinate the hazard identification process with the aerodrome operator and, where necessary, the air traffic services (ATS) provider.

(b)Hazard identification should be based on a combination of reactive, proactive, and predictive methods of safety data collection. Reactive, proactive, and predictive schemes for hazard identification should be the formal means of collecting, recording, analysing, acting on, and generating feedback about hazards and the associated risks that affect safety.

(c)All reporting systems, including confidential reporting schemes, should include an effective feedback process.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

(a)Hazard identification — General

(1)Hazard identification may include the following factors and processes:

(i)design factors, including equipment and task design;

(ii)procedures and operating practices, including the related documentation and checklists, and their validation under actual operating conditions;

(iii)communications, including the means, terminology and language;

(iv)personnel factors, such as company policies for recruitment, training, remuneration, and allocation of resources;

(v)organisational factors, such as the compatibility of production and safety goals, the allocation of resources, operating pressure, and the corporate safety culture;

(vi)work environment factors, such as ambient noise and vibration, temperature, lighting, and the availability of protective equipment and clothing;

(vii)regulatory oversight factors, including the applicability and enforceability of regulations, the certification of equipment, personnel, and procedures, and the adequacy of oversight;

(viii)defences, including factors such as the provision of adequate detection and warning systems, the error tolerance of equipment, and the resilience of equipment to errors and failures; and

(ix)human performance, restricted to medical conditions and physical limitations.

(2)For hazard identification, internal and external sources may be used.

(i)Internal sources:

(A)voluntary occurrence-reporting schemes;

(B)safety surveys;

(C)safety audits;

(D)normal operations monitoring schemes;

(E)trend analysis;

(F)feedback from training; and

(G)investigation of incidents and follow-up.

(ii)External sources:

(A)accident reports;

(B)State mandatory occurrence-reporting system; and

(C)State voluntary occurrence-reporting system.

(3)The methods used for hazard identification depend on the resources and constraints of each particular organisation, and on the size and complexity of its operations. Nevertheless, hazard identification, regardless of implementation, complexity and size, is part of the organisation’s safety documentation. In the context of mature safety management practices, hazard identification is a continuous, daily activity. It is an integral part of the organisation’s processes. There are three specific conditions under which special attention to hazard identification should be paid. These three conditions should trigger more in-depth and far-reaching hazard identification activities, and include:

(i)any time the organisation experiences an unexplained increase in safety-related events or regulatory infractions;

(ii)any time major operational changes are foreseen, including changes to key personnel or other major equipment or systems; and

(iii)before and during periods of significant organisational changes, including rapid growth or contraction, corporate mergers, acquisitions, or downsizing.

(4)For hazard identification, the following tools and techniques may be used:

(i)brainstorming, which is an unbounded but facilitated discussion with a group of experts;

(ii)the hazard and operability (HAZOP) study, which is a systematic and structured approach using parameter and deviation guidewords. This technique relies on a very detailed system description being available for study, and usually involves breaking down the system into well-defined subsystems and functional or process flows between subsystems. Each element of the system is then subject to discussion within a multidisciplinary group of experts against the various combinations of the guidewords and deviations;

(iii)checklists, which are lists of known hazards or hazard causes that have been derived from past experience. Past experience could be previous risk assessments, or similar systems, or operations, or from actual incidents that have occurred in the past. This technique involves the systematic use of an appropriate checklist, and the consideration of each item on the checklist for possible applicability to a particular system. Checklists are always validated for applicability prior to use;

(iv)the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), which is a ‘bottom-up’ technique used to consider ways in which the basic components of a system can fail to perform their design intent. This technique relies on a detailed system description, and considers the ways in which each subcomponent of the system could fail to meet its design intent, and what the consequences could be for the overall system. For each subcomponent of a system, the FMEA considers:

(A)all the potential ways that the component could fail;

(B)the effects that each of these failures would have on the system behaviour;

(C)the possible causes of the various failure modes; and

(D)how the failures might be mitigated within the system or its environment. The system level at which the analysis is applied can vary, and is determined by the level of detail of the system description used to support the analysis. Depending on the nature and complexity of the system, the analysis could be undertaken by an individual system expert, or by a team of system experts that act in group sessions.

(v)the structured what-if technique (SWIFT) is a simple and effective technique, alternative to the HAZOP study, and involves a multidisciplinary team of experts. It is a facilitated brainstorming group activity, but is typically carried out on a higherlevel system description, having fewer sub-elements than the HAZOP study and with a reduced set of prompts.

(5)Identified hazards are registered in a hazard log (hazard register). The nature and format of such a hazard log may vary from a simple list of hazards to a more sophisticated relational database linking hazards to mitigations, responsibilities, and actions. The following information is included in the hazard log:

(i)unique hazard reference number against each hazard;

(ii)hazard description;

(iii)indication of the potential causes of the hazard;

(iv)qualitative assessment of the possible outcomes and severities of the consequences arising from the hazard;

(v)qualitative assessment of the risk associated with the possible consequences of the hazard;

(vi)description of the existing risk controls for the hazard; description of additional actions that are required to reduce safety risks, as well as target date of their completion; and

(vii)indication of responsibilities in relation to the management of risk controls.

(6)Additionally, the following information may also be included in the hazard log:

(i)a quantitative assessment of the risk associated with the possible consequences of the hazard;

(ii)record of actual incidents or events related to the hazard, or its causes;

(iii)risk-tolerability statement;

(iv)statement of formal system-monitoring requirements;

(v)indication of how the hazard was identified;

(vi)hazard owner;

(vii)assumptions; and

(viii)third-party stakeholders.

(b)Hazard identification — Indicators

(1)Reactive (lagging) indicators: Metrics that measure events which have already occurred and that impact on safety performance. As reactive (lagging) indicators only reflect system failures, their use can only result in determining a reactive response. Although they do measure failure to control hazards, they do not normally reveal why the system failed, or if there are any latent hazards.

(2)Proactive (leading) indicators: Metrics that measure inputs to the safety system (either within an organisation, a sector, or across the total aviation system) to manage and improve safety performance. Proactive (leading) indicators indicate good safety practices being introduced, developed and adapted, which, by their inclusion, seek to establish a proactive safety environment that engenders continuous improvement. They provide useful information when accident and incident rates are low to identify latent hazards and potential threats, and consequent opportunities for improvement. There should always be a connection between a proactive indicator and the unwanted outcomes (or reactive indicators) that their monitoring is intended to warn against.

(3)Predictive indicators (precursor events): These metrics can be considered as indicators that do not manifest themselves in accidents or serious incidents. They indicate less severe system failures or ‘near misses’ which, when combined with other events, may lead to an accident or a serious incident. In a large organisation, a mature safety management system includes all these measures. Risk-management efforts, however, are targeted at proactive (leading) indicators and predictive indicators (precursor events).

SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MITIGATION

(a)A formal safety risk assessment and risk-mitigation process should be developed and maintained that ensures risk analysis (in terms of probability and severity of occurrence), risk assessment (in terms of tolerability), and risk control (in terms of mitigation).

(b)The levels of management that have the authority to make decisions regarding the tolerability of safety risks, in accordance with (a) above, should be specified in the management manual. The decisions should be coordinated with the aerodrome operator and, where necessary, the air traffic services (ATS) provider.

SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MITIGATION Safety risk assessment is the analysis of the safety risks of the consequences of the hazards that have been determined. The safety risk analysis breaks down the risks into two components: the probability of occurrence of a damaging event or condition, and the severity of the damaging event or condition, should it occur. Safety risk decision-making and acceptance should be specified through a risk-tolerability matrix. The definition and final construction of the matrix is left to the aerodrome operator to design, is documented in the aerodrome manual, and is subject to approval by the Competent Authority.

SAFETY PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND MEASUREMENT

(a)Safety performance monitoring and measurement should be the process by which the safety performance of the organisation responsible for the provision of AMS is verified in comparison to the established safety policy and objectives, identified safety risks and the risk-mitigation measures.

(b)This process should include the setting of safety performance indicators and safety performance targets, and measuring the organisation’s safety performance against them.

(c)The safety performance indicators and targets should be agreed with the aerodrome operator and should not contravene the safety performance indicators and targets of the aerodrome operator and, where applicable, the air traffic services (ATS) provider.

SAFETY PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND MEASUREMENT

(a)The performance monitoring and measurement process includes:

(1)safety reporting, addressing also the status of the organisation’s compliance with the applicable requirements;

(2)safety studies which are rather large analyses encompassing broad safety concerns;

(3)safety reviews, including trends reviews which are conducted during the introduction and deployment of new technologies, change or implementation of procedures, or in situations of structural changes in operations, or to explore the increase in incidents or safety reports;

(4)safety audits which focus on the integrity of the organisation’s management system, and periodically assess the status of safety risk controls;

(5)safety surveys which examine particular elements or procedures of a specific operation, such as problem areas or bottlenecks in daily operations, perception and opinions of operational personnel, and areas of dissent or confusion; and

(6)internal safety investigations of occurrences.

(b)The following generic aspects/areas may be considered:

(1)accountability for the management of the operational activities and their ultimate accomplishment;

(2)authority to direct, control or change the procedures, as well as to make key decisions such as safety risk acceptance decisions;

(3)procedures for operational activities;

(4)controls, including hardware, software, special procedures or procedural steps, and supervisory practices designed to keep operational activities on track;

(5)interfaces, including lines of authority between departments, lines of communication between employees, consistency of procedures, and clear delineation of responsibility between organisations, work units, and employees; and

(6)process measures to provide feedback to parties in charge that required actions are taking place, required outputs are being produced, and expected outcomes are being achieved.

CHANGE MANAGEMENT The organisation responsible for the provision of AMS should manage the safety risks related to a change. The management of a change should be a documented process to identify external and internal changes that may have an adverse effect on safety. The management of a change should make use of the organisation’s existing hazard identification, safety risk assessment, and mitigation processes.

CHANGE MANAGEMENT

(a)A change can introduce new hazards and impact on the appropriateness and/or effectiveness of existing safety risk mitigation strategies. A change may be external to the organisation, or internal.

(b)A formal process for the management of change considers the following:

(1)the criticality of systems and activities;

(2)the stability of systems and operational environments; and

(3)the organisation’s past performance.

(c)System description is one of the fundamental preliminary activities in the planning of the safety management system to determine a baseline hazard analysis for the system. As part of the formal process of the management of change, the system description and the baseline hazard analysis are reviewed periodically, even if circumstances of change are not present, to determine their continued validity. When changes to the system are made, and periodically thereafter, the organisation responsible for the provision of AMS goes over its system and its actual operational environment in order to make sure it continues to be fully aware of the circumstances under which the provision of AMS takes place. With regard to the management of change and safety (risk) assessments related to changes, see also ADR.OR.F.025 and GM1 ADR.OR.F.025(d).

CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT OF THE SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM The organisation responsible for the provision of AMS should continuously seek to improve its safety performance. The organisation should develop and maintain a relevant formal process in this regard. Continuous improvement should be achieved through:

(a)the proactive and reactive evaluation of facilities, equipment, documentation and procedures;

(b)the proactive evaluation of an individual’s performance to verify they fulfil their safety responsibilities; and

(c)reactive evaluations to verify the effectiveness of the system as regards the control and mitigation of safety risks.

CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT OF THE SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM The continuous improvement of the safety management system, as part of the safety assurance, is achieved through the following:

(a)internal evaluations;

(b)independent audits, both internal and external;

(c)strict document controls; and

(d)continuous monitoring of safety controls and mitigation actions.

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING

(a)The organisation responsible for the provision of AMS should establish a safety management system training programme for all personnel involved in the provision of AMS, including all management staff (e.g. supervisors, managers, senior managers, and the accountable manager), regardless of their position in the hierarchy of the organisation.

(b)The amount and level of detail of the safety management system training should be proportionate and appropriate to the individual’s responsibilities and involvement in the safety management system of the organisation.

(c)The safety management system training programme should be developed in accordance with AMC1 ADR.OR.D.017(a);(b) and be incorporated in the training programme foreseen therein.

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING — PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

(a)Operations and maintenance personnel

(1)The safety management system training addresses all safety-related responsibilities, including adherence to all operational and safety procedures, and identifying and reporting hazards.

(2)The training objectives include the organisation’s safety policy and safety management system fundamentals and overview.

(3)The training contents include the following:

(i)the definition of hazards;

(ii)the consequences of hazards and risks;

(iii)the safety risk management process, including roles and responsibilities; and

(iv)safety reporting and the organisation’s safety reporting system(s).

(b)Managers and supervisors

(1)The safety management system training addresses safety-related responsibilities, including the promotion of the safety management system (SMS) and engaging operational personnel in hazard reporting.

(2)In addition to the training objectives established for operational personnel, the training objectives for managers and supervisors include a detailed knowledge of the safety process, hazard identification and safety risk management and mitigation, and change management.

(3)In addition to the contents specified for operational personnel, the training contents for supervisors and managers include safety data analysis.

(c)Senior managers

(1)The safety management system training would include safety-related responsibilities, including compliance with European Union, national and the organisation’s own safety requirements, allocation of resources, ensuring effective inter-departmental safety communication, and active promotion of the safety management system.

(2)In addition to the objectives for the two previous employee groups, the safety management system training includes also safety assurance and safety promotion, safety roles and responsibilities, and the establishment of an acceptable level of safety.

(d)Accountable manager The training would provide the accountable manager with a general awareness of the organisation’s safety management system, including safety management system roles and responsibilities, safety policy and objectives, safety risk management, and safety assurance.

SAFETY COMMUNICATION

(a)The organisation responsible for the provision of AMS should communicate the safety management system objectives and procedures to all operational personnel, and the safety management system and its application should be evident in all aspects of the organisation’s operations.

(b)There should be a communication flow between the safety manager and the operational personnel throughout the organisation. The safety manager should communicate the performance of the organisation’s safety management system via suitable means. The safety manager should also ensure that lessons learned from investigations, safety-related events or other safety-related experience, both internally and from other organisations, are distributed widely within the organisation.

(c)Safety communication should aim to:

(1)ensure that all staff are fully aware of the organisation’s safety management system;

(2)convey safety-critical information;

(3)explain why particular actions are taken; and

(4)explain why safety procedures are introduced or changed.

SAFETY COMMUNICATION

(a)The following means may be used to communicate safety information:

(1)the safety management system (SMS) manual;

(2)safety processes and procedures;

(3)safety newsletters, notices, and bulletins; and

(4)websites or emails.

(b)Regular meetings with staff, where information, actions and procedures are discussed, may also be used to communicate safety information.

COMPLIANCE MONITORING

(a)Compliance monitoring

(1)The implementation and use of a compliance-monitoring process should enable the organisation responsible for the provision of AMS to monitor the organisation’s compliance with the relevant requirements of this Part, of Part-ADR.OPS, as well as with any other applicable regulatory requirements, or requirements established by the aerodrome operator or the air traffic services (ATS) provider.

(2)The compliance-monitoring process should be properly implemented, maintained and continually reviewed and improved, as necessary.

(3)Compliance monitoring should include a system to feed findings back to the accountable manager to ensure the effective implementation of corrective actions, as necessary.

(4)The organisation responsible for the provision of AMS should monitor the consistent application of its procedures, and compliance with the applicable procedures of the aerodrome operator and of the ATS provider to ensure that the activities are performed safely. In doing so, the AMS provider should, as a minimum, and where appropriate, monitor compliance with:

(i)its privileges;

(ii)the manuals, logs, and records;

(iii)the training standards;

(iv)the required resources;

(v)the management system procedures and manuals; and

(vi)the activities of the organisation carried out under the supervision of the person nominated in accordance with point ADR.OR.F.065(a)(2).

(b)Organisational set-up

(1)To ensure that the organisation continues to meet the requirements of this Part and of other applicable parts, the accountable manager should designate a person responsible for compliance monitoring.

(2)Compliance monitoring should be an independent function. If the person responsible for compliance monitoring has also another function, that person’s independence should be established by ensuring that audits and inspections are carried out by personnel that are not responsible for the function, procedure, etc., being audited.

(3)Staff involved in compliance monitoring should have access to any part of the organisation and, as necessary, to any contracted organisation.

(c)Compliance-monitoring documentation

(1)Relevant documentation should include the relevant part(s) of the organisation’s management system documentation.

(2)In addition, relevant documentation should also include the following:

(i)terminology;

(ii)specified activity standards;

(iii)a description of the organisation;

(iv)the allocation of duties and responsibilities;

(v)procedures to ensure regulatory compliance;

(vi)the compliance-monitoring programme which reflects:

(A)the schedule of the monitoring programme;

(B)audit procedures, including an audit plan that is implemented, maintained and continually reviewed and improved;

(C)reporting procedures;

(D)follow-up and corrective action procedures; and

(E)the recording system;

(vii)the training syllabus referred to in point (d)(2) below; and

(viii)document control.

(d)Training

(1)Proper and thorough training is essential to optimise compliance. In order to achieve optimum outcome of such training, the AMS provider should ensure that all personnel understand the objectives as laid down in the AMS provider’s management system documentation.

(2)The staff member responsible for managing compliance monitoring should receive training in this task. Such training should cover the compliance-monitoring requirements, the manuals and procedures related to the task, audit techniques, reporting, and recording.

(3)The time should be provided to train the staff involved in compliance management, and for briefing the rest of the staff.

(4)The allocation of time and resources should be based on the volume and complexity of the activities concerned.

(e)Compliance monitoring — audit scheduling

(1)Defined audit schedules to be completed during a specified period as well as a periodic review cycle for each audited area should be established. The compliance monitoring itself should also be audited according to a defined audit schedule. The schedule should allow for unscheduled audits when non-compliance data shows an increasing trend. Follow-up audits should be scheduled to verify that corrective action has been carried out, and that it has been effective and completed, in accordance with the policies and procedures specified in the aerodrome manual.

(2)The management system’s key processes, procedures and the operation of the organisation responsible for the provision of AMS should be audited within the first 12 months from the date on which the declaration was first registered.

(3)Following that, the organisation responsible for the provision of AMS should consider the results of its safety (risk) assessments and of its past compliance-monitoring activities in order to adapt the period within which an audit or a series of audits should be conducted, to cover its management system’s key processes, procedures and operations in a manner and at intervals set out in the management system manual. This period should be consistent with the relevant Competent Authority’s oversight planning cycle and may be extended up to 36 months, in coordination with the Competent Authority, provided that there are no level 1 findings, and subject to the organisation responsible for the provision of AMS having a good record of addressing findings in a timely manner.

COMPLIANCE MONITORING — GENERAL

(a)The person responsible for compliance monitoring may perform all audits and inspections themselves or may appoint one or more auditors by choosing staff, either from within or outside the organisation, which have the related competence as defined in point (d) of AMC2 ADR.OR.F.045(b)(10).

(b)Regardless of the option chosen in point (a) above, the organisation ensures that the independence of the audit function is not affected, particularly in cases where staff that perform the audit or the inspection are also responsible for other functions within the organisation.

(c)If external staff are used to perform compliance audits or inspections:

(1)such audits or inspections would be performed under the responsibility of the person responsible for compliance monitoring; and

(2)the organisation responsible for the provision of AMS remains responsible for ensuring that external staff have the appropriate knowledge, background and experience with regard to the activities being audited or inspected, including knowledge of and experience in compliance monitoring.

(d)The organisation responsible for the provision of AMS has the ultimate responsibility for the effectiveness of compliance monitoring, particularly for the effective implementation and follow-up of all corrective actions.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPLIANCE MONITORING

(a)The responsibility for compliance monitoring should:

(1)lie with a person that has direct access and is responsible to the accountable manager;

(2)not lie with a person that is nominated in accordance with point ADR.OR.F.065(a)(2).

(b)Depending on the size of the organisation and the type and complexity of its operations, the task of compliance monitoring may be performed by the accountable manager provided they have demonstrated they have the related competence as defined in point (d) below.

(c)If the same person acts both as compliance-monitoring manager and as safety manager, the accountable manager, with regard to their direct accountability as regards safety, should ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to both functions, taking into account the size of the organisation and the type and complexity of its operations.

(d)Persons that are allocated the responsibility for compliance monitoring should have:

(1)adequate experience and expertise in aerodrome operations or in the provision of apron management services (AMS) or air traffic services (ATS);

(2)adequate knowledge of and experience in safety management and quality assurance;

(3)knowledge of the aerodrome manual and as regards the organisation responsible for the provision of AMS, of its management manual; and

(4)comprehensive knowledge of the applicable requirements in the area of aerodromes, AMS or ATS.

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION The organisation responsible for the provision of AMS should ensure that the key processes of its documented management system include a process for making personnel aware of their responsibilities, as well as its amendment procedure. The documented management system of the organisation responsible for the provision of AMS should include at least the following information:

(a)a statement signed by the accountable manager confirming that the organisation will continuously work in accordance with the applicable requirements, with the requirements of the aerodrome operator and of the air traffic services (ATS) provider, and with the organisation’s documented management system;

(b)the organisation’s scope of activities;

(c)the titles and names of the persons referred to in point ADR.OR.F.065 and in AMC2 ADR.OR.F.045(b)(10);

(d)an organisation chart showing the lines of responsibility between the nominated persons;

(e)the procedures specifying how the organisation ensures compliance with the applicable requirements;

(f)the amendment procedure for the organisation’s management system documentation; and

(g)the safety management system outputs.

SAFETY MANAGEMENT MANUAL

(a)For cases where safety management is set out in a safety management manual, it should be the key instrument for communicating the approach of the organisation responsible for the provision of AMS to safety. The safety management manual should document all aspects of safety management, including the safety policy, its objectives, procedures, and the safety responsibilities of individuals.

(b)The safety management manual should include the following:

(1)the scope of the safety management system;

(2)the safety policy and its objectives;

(3)the safety responsibilities of key safety personnel;

(4)the documentation control procedures;

(5)the safety assessment process, including hazard identification and risk management schemes;

(6)the monitoring of implementation and the effectiveness of the safety actions and riskmitigation measures;

(7)safety performance monitoring;

(8)safety reporting (including hazard reporting) and investigation;

(9)the change management (including organisational changes with regard to safety responsibilities);

(10)safety promotion; and

(11)safety management system outputs.

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION It is not required to duplicate information in several manuals. The safety management manual is considered part of the management manual of the organisation responsible for the provision of AMS.