SPA.LVO.105 Specific approval criteria

AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION FOR THE INTENDED OPERATIONS

(a)Aircraft used for LVTO in an RVR of less than 125 m should be equipped with a system certified for the purpose.

(b)Aircraft used for low-visibility approach operations should be equipped in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements and certified as follows:

(1)For CAT II operations, the aircraft should be certified for CAT II operations.

(2)For CAT III operations, the aircraft should be certified for CAT III operations.

(3)For SA CAT I, the aircraft should be certified for SA CAT I operations.

(4)For SA CAT II, the aircraft should be certified for CAT II operations and be equipped with HUDLS or fail-passive autoland or better.

(5)For EFVS operations, the aircraft should be equipped with a certified EFVS-A or EFVS-L.

AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION — EQUIPMENT ELIGIBLE FOR LOW VISIBILITY TAKE-OFF IN AN RVR LESS THAN 125 M Systems that are used to qualify for take-off in an RVR less than 125 m typically allow the pilot to use the external visual cues as well as instrumented guidance to track the runway centre line. The kind of systems in use today include paravisual display (PVD) and HUD. It is expected that EFVSs will be certified for take-off guidance in the future. Where the PVD or HUD uses an ILS localiser signal as reference, the ILS sensitive area must be protected by the LVPs at the aerodrome.

OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR LVOs Prior to commencing an LVO, the pilot-in-command/commander should be satisfied that:

(a)the status of visual and non-visual facilities is as required;

(b)if LVPs are required for such operations, LVPs are in effect; and

(c)the flight crew members are appropriately qualified.

OPERATING PROCEDURES — GENERAL

(a)Operating procedures should be established for all types of LVOs and operations with operational credits for which an operator is seeking approval. The operating procedures should:

(1)be consistent with the AFM;

(2)be appropriate to the technology and equipment to be used;

(3)specify the duties and responsibilities of each flight crew member in each relevant phase of flight;

(4)ensure that flight crew workload is managed to facilitate effective decision-making and monitoring of the aircraft; and

(5)minimise, as much as practical, the deviation from normal procedures used for routine operations (non-LVOs).

(b)Operating procedures should include:

(1)the required checks for the satisfactory functioning of the aircraft equipment, both before departure and in flight;

(2)the correct seating and eye position;

(3)determination of aerodrome operating minima;

(4)the increment to be added to minima for use by pilots-in-command/commanders who are new to the aircraft type, if applicable;

(5)the effect on aerodrome operating minima of temporarily failed or downgraded ground equipment;

(6)the effect on aerodrome operating minima of the failure or change of the status of any aircraft systems;

(7)when the LVPs at the aerodrome are required. LVPs are required:

(i)for low-visibility flight approach operations;

(ii)for LVTOs with RVR less than 400 m. If an operator selects an aerodrome with equivalent procedures, where the term ‘LVPs’ is not used (e.g. regional procedures), the operator should verify that suitable procedures are established to ensure an equivalent level of safety to that achieved at approved aerodromes. This situation should be clearly noted in the operations manual or procedures manual, including guidance to the flight crew on how to determine that the suitable procedures are in effect at the time of an actual operation. Note: the AFM may state that some elements of LVPs are not required and therefore the equivalent level of safety may be established on that basis;

(8)a requirement for an ‘approaching minima’ call-out to prevent inadvertent descent below the DA/H;

(9)the requirement for height call-outs below 200 ft to be based on the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if applicable;

(10)the required visual references;

(11)the action to be taken in the event of loss of the required visual references; and

(12)the maximum allowable flight path deviations and action to be taken in the event that such deviations occur.

(c)Operators required to comply with the requirements of Annex III (Part-ORO) to this Regulation should include operating procedures in the operations manual as required by ORO.MLR.100. The operators to which Part-ORO does not apply should include the operating procedures in a ‘procedures manual’.

OPERATING PROCEDURES — CAT II For CAT II operations, the following should apply:

(a)The flight crew should consist of at least two pilots.

(b)The approach should be flown using a certified system as identified in the AFM.

(c)If the approach is flown using autopilot, for a manual landing the autopilot should remain engaged until after the pilot has achieved visual reference.

(d)All height call-outs below 200 ft above the runway threshold elevation should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance.

(e)The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process.

(f)At DH, the following visual references should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:

(1)a segment of at least three consecutive lights, which are the centre line of the approach lights or TDZ lights or runway centre line lights or edge lights or a combination of these; and

(2)a visual reference that should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach lighting crossbar, or the landing threshold, or a barrette of the TDZ lighting unless the operation is conducted using a HUD or an equivalent system to touchdown.

OPERATING PROCEDURES — CAT III For CAT III operations, the following should apply:

(a)The flight crew should consist of at least two pilots.

(b)The approach should be flown using a certified system as identified in the AFM.

(c)All height call-outs below 200 ft above the runway threshold elevation should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance.

(d)For operations in which a DH is used, the DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process.

(e)At DH, the following visual references should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:

(1)for operations conducted either with fail-passive flight control systems or with the use of an approved HUD or equivalent display system: a segment of at least three consecutive lights, which are the centre line of the approach lights, or TDZ lights, or runway centre line lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these; and

(2)for operations conducted either with fail-operational flight control systems or with a fail-operational hybrid landing system using a DH: at least one centre line light to be attained and maintained by the pilot.

(f)For operations with no DH, there is no specification for visual reference with the runway prior to touchdown.

OPERATING PROCEDURES — SA CAT I For SA CAT I operations, the following should apply:

(a)The approach should be flown using a certified system as identified in the AFM.

(b)All height call-outs below 200 ft above the runway threshold elevation should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance.

(c)The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process.

(d)At DH the following visual references should be visible to the pilot:

(1)a segment of at least three consecutive lights, which are the centre line of the approach lights, or TDZ lights, or runway centre line lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these; and

(2)a visual reference that should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach lighting crossbar, or the landing threshold, or a barrette of the TDZ lighting unless the operation is conducted utilising an approved HUD or an equivalent system usable down to 120 ft above the runway threshold.

OPERATING PROCEDURES — SA CAT II For SA CAT II operations, the following should apply:

(a)The flight crew should consist of at least two pilots.

(b)The approach should be flown using a certified HUDLS or autoland system as identified in the AFM.

(c)All height call-outs below 200 ft above the runway threshold elevation should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance.

(d)The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process.

(e)At DH the visual references should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:

(1)a segment of at least three consecutive lights, which are the centre line of the approach lights or TDZ lights, or runway centre line lights, or runway edge lights or a combination of these;

(2)a visual reference that should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach lighting crossbar, or the landing threshold, or a barrette of the TDZ lighting.

OPERATING PROCEDURES — EFVS OPERATIONS TO A RUNWAY For EFVS operations to a runway, the following should apply:

(a)The approach should be flown using a certified EFVS-A or EFVS-L as identified in the AFM.

(b)The pilot flying should use the EFVS throughout the approach.

(c)In multi-pilot operations, the pilot monitoring should monitor the EFVS-derived information.

(d)The approach between the final approach fix (FAF) and the DA/H should be flown using vertical flight path guidance mode (e.g. flight director).

(e)The approach may be continued below the DA/H provided that the pilot can identify on the EFVS image either:

(1)the approach light system; or

(2)both of the following:

(i)the runway threshold identified by the beginning of the runway landing surface, the threshold lights or the runway end identifier lights; and

(ii)the TDZ identified by the TDZ lights, the TDZ runway markings or the runway edge lights.

(f)Unless the aircraft is equipped with a certified EFVS-L, a missed approach should be executed promptly if the required visual reference is not distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EFVS by the following height above the threshold:

(1)the height below which an approach should not be continued if natural visual reference is not acquired by the crew as stated in the AFM; or

(2)if the AFM does not specify such a height, 100 ft.

FLIGHT CREW ACTIONS IN CASE OF AUTOPILOT FAILURE AT OR BELOW DH IN FAIL-PASSIVE CAT III OPERATIONS For operations to actual RVR values less than 300 m, a missed approach procedure is assumed in the event of an autopilot failure at or below DH. This means that a missed approach procedure is the normal action. However, the wording recognises that there may be circumstances where the safest action is to continue the landing. Such circumstances include the height at which the failure occurs, the actual visual references, and other malfunctions. This would typically apply to the late stages of the flare. In conclusion, it is not forbidden to continue the approach and complete the landing when the pilot-in-command/commander determines that this is the safest course of action. The operator’s policy and the operational instructions should reflect this information.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT — MONITORING, DATA COLLECTION AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR APPROACH OPERATIONS

(a)The operator should monitor LVOs and operations with operational credits in order to validate the effectiveness of the applicable aircraft flight guidance systems, training, flight crew procedures, and aircraft maintenance programme, and to identify hazards.

(b)Data should be collected whenever an LVO or an operation with an operational credit is attempted regardless of whether the approach is abandoned, is unsatisfactory, or is concluded successfully. The data should include records of the following:

(1)occasions when it was not possible to commence an approach due to deficiencies or unserviceabilities of related airborne equipment;

(2)occasions when approaches were discontinued, including the reasons for discontinuing the approach and the height above the runway at which the approach was discontinued;

(3)occasions when system abnormalities required pilot intervention to ensure a continued approach or safe landing;

(4)landing performance, whether or not the aircraft landed satisfactorily within the desired touchdown area with acceptable lateral velocity or cross-track error. The approximate lateral and longitudinal position of the actual touchdown point in relation to the runway centre line and the runway threshold, respectively, should be recorded.

(c)Data about LVOs should be collected by means of the operator’s flight data monitoring programme supplemented by other means including reports submitted by flight crew. Operators that do not have a flight data monitoring programme should use reports submitted by flight crew as the primary means of gathering data.

(d)Performance indicators should include the following:

(1)the rate of unsuccessful low-visibility approaches, i.e. the number of attempted approaches terminating in discontinued approaches, approaches where pilot intervention was required to ensure a continued approach or safe landing or where landing performance was unsatisfactory, compared to the number of low-visibility approaches attempted;

(2)measures of performance of the airborne equipment for low-visibility approaches or operations with operational credits;

(3)safety performance indicators related to other specific risks associated with LVOs.

(e)The following information should be retained for at least 5 years:

(1)the total number of low-visibility approaches or operations with an operational approval attempted or completed, including practice approaches, by aircraft type; and

(2)reports of unsatisfactory approaches and/or landings, by runway and aircraft registration, in the following categories:

(i)airborne equipment faults;

(ii)ground facility difficulties;

(iii)missed approaches because of air traffic control (ATC) instructions; or

(iv)other reasons.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO OBTAINING AN APPROVAL

(a)Prior to commencing LVOs or operations with operational credits, an operator should demonstrate to the competent authority that such operations will achieve an acceptable level of safety. This requires the operator to gather data from operations using the relevant systems and procedures and conduct safety assessments taking that data into account.

(b)The operator applying for the approval of low-visibility approach operations should determine the minimum number of approaches required to gather sufficient data to demonstrate an acceptable level of safety and the time period over which such data should be gathered.

(c)If an operator is applying for more than one LVO approval or an approval for operation with operational credits for a particular aircraft type, then data gathered from operations using the systems and procedures designed for one classification of operations or operation with operational credits may be used to support the application for another classification of operations or operation with operational credits provided the following elements are similar:

(1)type of technology, including:

(i)flight control/guidance system (FGS) and associated displays and controls;

(ii)flight management system (FMS) and level of integration with the FGS;

(iii)use of HUD or an equivalent display system; and

(iv)use of EFVS;

(2)operational procedures, including:

(i)alert height;

(ii)manual landing/automatic landing;

(iii)no DH operations;

(iv)use of HUD or an equivalent display system in hybrid operations; and

(v)use of EFVS to touchdown; and

(3)handling characteristics, including:

(i)manual landing from automatic or HUD or an equivalent display system guided approach;

(ii)manual missed approach procedure from automatic approach; and

(iii)automatic/manual roll-out.

(d)An operator holding an approval for low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits may use data gathered from approaches conducted using one aircraft type to support an application for approval for a different aircraft type or variants provided the following elements are similar:

(1)type of technology, including the following:

(i)FGS and associated displays and controls;

(ii)FMS and level of integration with the FGS;

(iii)use of HUD or an equivalent display system; and

(iv)use of EFVS;

(2)operational procedures, including:

(i)alert height;

(ii)manual landing/automatic landing;

(iii)no DH operations;

(iv)use of HUD or an equivalent display system in hybrid operations; and

(v)use of EFVS to touchdown; and

(3)handling characteristics, including:

(i)manual landing from automatic or HUD or an equivalent display system guided approach;

(ii)manual missed approach procedure from automatic approach; and

(iii)automatic/manual roll-out.

SPECIFIC APPROVAL CRITERIA — SUCCESSFUL APPROACH AND LANDING

(a)The purpose of this GM is to provide operators with supplemental information regarding the criteria for a successful approach and landing.

(b)An approach may be considered to be successful if:

(1)from 500 ft to start of flare:

(i)speed is maintained within +/- 5 kt of the intended speed, disregarding rapid fluctuations due to turbulence;

(ii)no relevant system failure occurs; and

(2)from 300 ft to DH:

(i)no excess deviation occurs; and

(ii)no centralised warning gives a missed approach procedure command (if installed).

(c)A landing may be considered to be successful if:

(1)no relevant system failure occurs;

(2)no flare failure occurs;

(3)no de-crab failure occurs (if installed);

(4)longitudinal touchdown is beyond a point on the runway 150 m after the threshold and before the end of the touchdown zone (TDZ) (750 m from the threshold);

(5)lateral touchdown with the outboard landing gear is not outside the TDZ edge;

(6)sink rate is not excessive;

(7)bank angle does not exceed a bank angle limit; and

(8)no roll-out failure or deviation (if installed) occurs.

(d)More details can be found in CS AWO.A.ALS.106, CS AWO.B.CATII.113 and AMC AWO.B.CATII.113.

SAFETY PERFORMANCE MONITORING

(a)Data gathering for safety performance monitoring of LVOs and operations with operational credits will need to include sufficient information for the operator to identify hazards and assess the risks associated with LVOs and operations with operational credits.

(b)The following data relating to LVOs and operations with operational credits may be gathered via flight crew reports, flight data monitoring or other means, as appropriate:

(1)date and time;

(2)aircraft details (type and registration);

(3)airport, approach procedure, final approach and take-off area (FATO) and/or runway used;

(4)the type of LVO or operation with operational credits attempted or completed;

(5)weather conditions including wind, reported RVR and natural phenomena that restrict visibility;

(6)the reason for a discontinued approach (if applicable);

(7)details of any pilot intervention to ensure a continued approach or safe landing;

(8)adequacy of speed control;

(9)trim at time of automatic flight control system disengagement (if applicable);

(10)compatibility of automatic flight control system, flight director and raw data;

(11)an indication of the position of the aircraft relative to the centre line when descending through to 100 ft;

(12)touchdown position relative to the TDZ;

(13)an assessment of the sink rate, lateral velocity and bank angle at touchdown;

(14)the nature of any problems encountered by the crew in relation to operating procedures or training; and

(15)any human factors issues that arose in relation to the operation.

(c)Where data is gathered as part of the operator’s flight data monitoring programme, procedures should be established to ensure that information that is only available directly from the flight crew or other sources (e.g. weather information) is captured.

(d)In order to assess the risks associated with LVOs and operations with operational credits, operators may consider hazards with the potential to result in the following unacceptable safety outcomes:

(1)loss of control in flight;

(2)runway overrun or excursion;

(3)controlled flight into terrain;

(4)runway incursion and ground collision; and

(5)airborne conflict.

(e)Operators’ safety control processes will ensure that LVOs and operations with operational credits:

(1)meet the safety objectives and performance standards established in the operator’s safety policy;

(2)achieve at least the same level of safety as operations other than LVOs and operations without operational credits; and

(3)have a continuously improving safety performance.

(f)Two methods to determine the rate of unsuccessful low-visibility approaches are described below:

(1)Fail/pass method (binary): the rate of unsuccessful low-visibility approaches determined in accordance with GM1 SPA.LVO.105(g) should not exceed 5 %. If the unsuccessful operations appear to occur on a given aircraft, aircraft series or runway, specific mitigation measures need to be established and a separate specific rate may need to be calculated and monitored. Note: the term ‘aircraft series’ is explained in GM5 SPA.LVO.110. Operators may choose to apply a lower rate than 5 %.

(2)Continuous method: this method may be selected by operators with a flight data monitoring programme. This methodology is more refined and allows identifying undesirable trends earlier and possibly before they become severe. This method applies an event monitoring methodology in which the deviations from the nominal performance are categorised according to their severity (severity index). For each event (criterion), a level of deviation may be defined as follows:

(i)Low (‘green’: the deviation is small and within the limits of nominal behaviour. No action is required.)

(ii)Medium (‘yellow’): the deviation is above the criteria for low (‘green’) and below the criteria for high (‘red’). No corrective action should be required based on an isolated occurrence; however, a corrective action should be taken if the situation does not improve, or a negative trend is identified. The monitoring should then focus on the particular runway or aircraft series or combination of those.

(iii)High (‘red’): the deviation is undesirably high. Investigation and corrective action should be undertaken even based on an isolated occurrence. The threshold for level high (‘red’) may be based on the criteria of GM1 SPA.LVO.105(g).

DATA GATHERING FOR SAFETY ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO OBTAINING AN APPROVAL

(a)General The intention of the safety assessment is to validate the use and effectiveness of the applicable aircraft flight control and guidance systems, procedures, flight crew training and aircraft maintenance programme. The intention is not to repeat the statistical analysis required for certification of equipment, but rather to demonstrate that the various elements of the ‘total system’ for LVOs work together for a particular operator.

(b)Data gathering for safety assessment — LVTOs

(1)If the procedures used for LVTOs are not significantly different from those used for standard take-offs, it may be sufficient for operators to conduct only a small number of take-offs using the procedures established for LVTOs for the purpose of data gathering. The following could be considered as a minimum:

(i)For LVTOs in an RVR of 125 m or more if procedures are similar to those used for standard take-offs: 1 take-off;

(ii)For LVTOs in an RVR of less than 125 m or any other LVTOs using specific procedures: 10 take-offs.

(2)An operator holding an approval for LVTOs on one aircraft type and applying the approval for LVTOs on another type or variant may use data from LVTOs conducted on the first type if the following are similar:

(i)level of technology, including flight deck displays, HUD or an equivalent guidance system;

(ii)operational procedures; and

(iii)handling characteristics.

(c)Data gathering for safety assessment — approach operations with a DH below 200 ft The data required for the safety assessment needs to be gathered from approaches conducted in a representative sample of expected operating conditions. The operator needs to take seasonal variations in operating conditions such as prevalent weather, planned destinations and operating bases, and ensure that the approaches used for data gathering are conducted over a sufficient period of time to be representative of the planned operation. In order to ensure that the data is representative of planned operations, approaches are conducted at a variety of airports and runways. If more than 30 % of the approaches are conducted to the same runway, the operator may increase the number of approaches required and take measures to ensure that the data is not distorted. The number of approaches used for data gathering will depend on the performance indicators and analysis methods used by the operator. The operator will need to demonstrate that the operation for which approval is sought will achieve an acceptable level of safety. The following figures may be considered a minimum for an operator without previous experience of low-visibility approach operations:

(1)for approval of operations with a DH of not less than 50 ft: 30 approaches;

(2)for approval of operations with a DH of less than 50 ft: 100 approaches. Approaches conducted for the purpose of gathering data in order to conduct a safety assessment prior to obtaining an LVO approval may be conducted in line operations or any other flight where the operator’s procedures are used. Approaches may also be conducted in an FSTD if the operator is satisfied that this would be representative of the operation. The data gathered from these approaches will only be representative if all required elements of the total system for LVOs are in place. These include not only operating procedures and airborne equipment, but also airport and ATC procedures and ground- or space-based navigation facilities. If the operator chooses to collect data from approaches conducted without all required elements in place, then the data analysis takes into account the effect of at least the following:

(1)air traffic services (ATS) factors including situations where a flight conducting an instrument approach is vectored too close to the FAF for satisfactory lateral and vertical path capture, lack of protection of ILS sensitive areas or ATS requests to discontinue the approach;

(2)misleading navigation signals such as ILS localiser irregularities caused by taxiing aircraft or aircraft overflying the localiser array;

(3)other specific factors that could affect the success of LVOs that are reported by the flight crew.

(d)Safety considerations for approaches used for data gathering If an operator chooses to collect data from approaches conducted without all required elements of the total system for LVOs in place, then the operator takes actions to ensure an acceptable level of safety.

(e)Sharing of data: operators may use data from other operators or aircraft manufacturers to support the safety assessment required to demonstrate an acceptable level of safety. The operator applying for a specific approval would need to demonstrate that the data used was relevant to the proposed operation.

(f)It is expected that operators will have more than 6 months or at least 1 000 hours of total operational experience on the aircraft model before they can have sufficient data to set up meaningful performance indicators and establish whether planned LVOs would achieve an acceptable level of safety.